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The metonymical association between 'China’ and 'revolution' is a rhetorical game 
savoured by contemporary China observers. Ironical references in Western press to 
Chinese 'consumer revolution7 and 'pop cultural revolution, made a parade of global 
capitalism's victory. Indisputably, vast social, cultural, and economic transformations 
have swept over China since 1992 when Deng Xiaoping gave his strategic Southern 
Excursion Talks to salvage a market reform mired in a bottleneck phase. Post-1992 
China witnessed a dramatic release of forces of production and a steady annual GDP 
growth. Accompanying this economic takeoff is the public's growing craze for 
consumption. A fully fledged buyers' market has come into being. Chinese con- 
sumers, budding desires for music CDs, fast and frozen food, and convertibles may 
indeed serve to validate the ascendance of a 'counter-revolution' to socialist ideology. 
Tugging economic and cultural indexes in tandem, Western journalists and pundits 
have shown us time and again: China illustrates a paramount example of crony 
capitalism's new conquest. 
 
'A fast drive to riches' (Powell 1997: 32); 
'The last days of a dynasty: economic reform has crumbled Deng’s "Authority of the 
Center" ' (Watson et al 1995: 39); 
'Kentucky Fried Chickens hatched in Beijing' (Cotter 1998: 1) 
 
There is no want of sensational headlines dramatizing the duel of two competing 
'regimes'. Is China the last battlefield of capitalism? Is what is being brought to its 
knees in the American fantasy nothing other than its old ideological foe: communism? 
Capital's virtual opponent, I argue, is neither a single country (a rival superpower or 
not) nor an alternative ideology, but a far more abstract, omnipresent and intractable 
one: the state. The conceptual turn - from internationalism to transnationalism and 
globalism - is well attested by our oversubscription to the terms of 'transnational 
culture’ and 'global economy’ - at the expense of 'nation' and ’state’- in re-mapping 
the New World Order. 
 
The erosion of the state question in scholarship on contemporary Western culture 
reached an acme in the mid-1990s. (Often times, the advocates of the thesis of the 
powerless state include immigrant third-world scholars trained in the West.1) Few 
swam against the ruling paradigm of transnationalism and globalization. Those who 
did, Michael Mann and Linda Weiss (1997) come to mind, argued for the continuing 
relevance of territorially constituted forms of governance. Of critical importance is 
those critics' questioning of the vision of a single global society and, in particular, of 
 
 
the claim to universalism inherent in those essentially Euro-American paradigms. 
Both Mann and Weiss contend that while transnational-global capitalism may have 
weakened the ‘northern’, nation-states (nations closely aligned with the European 
Union, EU), the thesis of the powerless state hardly applies to the 'southern’ states 
(Mann 1997). I may push their argument further by suggesting that even in the case 
of the EU, the blueprint for a federalist model has already generated an opposite 
vision. We should hardly be surprised at French President Jacques Chirac's latest 
response to the call of German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer for a pan-European 
government: 'neither [France nor Germany] wanted a European superstate that would 
substitute for nation states7 (Vinocur 2000: 1). 
 
Add China to the configuration and the issue at stake is more than the classical 
dilemma of (federalist) structure versus (nationalist) agency. A specific ideological 
agenda emerges to lend urgency to the Western thesis of the powerless state: the 
'contestation' between capitalism and socialism. A typical exercise in the US often 
renders a showcase of a changing China totally absorbed in those transnational and 
postmodern socio-cultural practices that are said to plunge the post-socialist country 
into an inexorable movement toward the borderless human condition of post- 
modernity. At the core of such discourses is the base-superstructural thinking that 
writes off the state as an instance of determination in social transformations. The locus 
of change is inscribed in an autonomous chain reaction triggered by capital - an 
'economic' revolution (changes in base structure) determined a popular 'cultural’ 
revolution on one hand, and necessitated the hollowing out of the post-socialist state, 
on the other. 
 
At issue is not only the base-superstructural thinking but also the paradigm of 
globalization, both of which posit the state as determined rather than determining. By 
privileging the state question, however, I am not suggesting that the Chinese post- 
socialist state operates outside the circuit of transnational capital. Today, it seems 
superfluous to reiterate the mutually constitutive relationship between the global and 
the local, and between the transnational and the national. I am not taking issue with 
theorists like Bob Jessop who perceives the 'relativisation of scale’ as the only valid 
conceptual model that captures the intricate processes of globalization (Jessop 1999). 
In his framework, no given scale of analysis, whether it is the local, the national, the 
regional, or the transnational, is foregrounded. My purpose here is to re-articulate the 
analytical scale of the state without ascribing the absolute value of agency either to 
transnational capital (as is usually the case) or to the post-socialist state. Western 
observers7 anxieties about vindicating capital as the sole agent of change in the case 
of China are too often symptomatic of the cold-war ideology. Perhaps more revelatory 
about such anxieties are the enunciatory position and the geographical location of 
those observers: positioned at the centre and located in Euro-America. 
 
Coming back to the specific context of post-1992 China, I ask: can the paradigm of 
transnational capital, important as it is, make a claim for its totalizing explanatory 
power for a case as unevenly and contradictorily configured as that of China? 
We have noted the dramatic repercussions of Deng Xiaoping's 1992 southern excur- 
sions, which steered a post-traumatic China into a U-turn toward liberal market 
economy. But 1989 usurped 1992 in the Western mental calendar. The story about 
the 'rehabilitation7 of an autocratic regime is hardly newsworthy unless it fits into the 
grand narrative of transnationalism. We are thus continually fed the paradox of an 
enterprising China today: its very success is built upon the bankruptcy of its ideology. 
In short, the Chinese state has sold its agenda to foreign investors. 
 
The theoretical implications of such a metanarrative are many: we are coached to 
assume that only the market has a logic, that the state entertains no 'idea' of its own 
but merely a set of contingent operations performing a functional reasoning, serving 
the needs of capital. At stake is more than the issue of how we can bring the trope 
of the state to a fuller theoretical account. What also matters is a nuanced understand- 
ing of the mutually constitutive relationship between transnationalism and nation- 
statism. The former often reinforces and naturalizes the latter, while the latter (even 
an ultra-statist regime like Malaysia)2 is committed to courting multinational capital 
and playing a complicit role in furthering the process of globalization. But our 
emphasis on the collusion between those two strange bedfellows often blinded us to 
the equally strong commitment made by the states - especially those situated in the 
third world - to position itself antagonistically vis-a-vis capital, thus saving rampant 
(transnational) capitalism from itself. 
 
This suggests that we view with caution all the first world hypes about the twin 
'culture-economy' interpretative lenses through which a developing country like 
China is being viewed systematically. The state question is always missing whenever 
we address China's epochal transition. We tend to talk about such a transition in 
terms of economy (movement from state to market economy) and culture (from high 
to pop, from national to transnational), but rarely in terms of the restructuring of the 
state ruling technology and the changing stock of its ideological practices. A system- 
atic study of the structural transformation of Chinese post-socialist state and the 
mutually constitutive relationship between state policies and popular social dis- 
courses is long overdue. I propose to put the analytical categories of 'state’ and 
'policy' back into our study of Chinese popular culture, which has been increasingly 
dominated by the trope of the market and transnationalism. 
 
I divide this paper into three parts. Part I introduces the notion of 'access' as a new 
command metaphor of the Chinese post-socialist state. Of particular interest is the 
state's invention of a series of discursive constructs that were assimilated into the 
daily lingo and social practices, serving to rationalize a different ruling technology. 
Part II examines the relationship between normalizing discourses, policies, and the 
entitlement of 'urban citizenship'. Part III returns to the theoretical question of the 
state and suggests future directions for policy-oriented Chinese popular cultural 
studies. This inquiry into the state problem will lead us to the less frequented domain 
of scholarship; namely, relations of policies and culture, which ultimately invites us 
to explore the interface between policy studies and cultural studies. 
 
 
Part I: popular discourse and state policy 
 
'Economic globalization is not a blessing but a danger/ In the wake of the Asian 
economic crisis in summer 1997, Chinese readers greeted such headlines at ever 
shorter intervals in their daily papers. One editorial after another urged the state to 
regulate finance markets and make pre-emptive strikes against global currency 
speculators. News like this raised alarm in all quarters. Will China move forward or 
back-pedal? This is a burning question that plagues those China watchers deeply 
entrenched in bipolar thinking - the centre is all or nothing.3 Few recognize that statist 
discourses in post-1992 China are both reality checkers and symbolic biddings. 
 
To illustrate the symbolic and real efficacy of state interventions - neither preclud- 
ing the other - I would like to cite two specific examples of post-1992 statutes, one 
with emblematic value only, and another, illustrative of a communist state in 
disciplinary action. 
 
To set a nutrition directive - 'A Planned Action for the Improvement of Nutrition 
in Chinese Diet’ (1998) - against a penal law banning "multi-level marketing' (1998) 
is to drive home my point: that Chinese statist regulation is sometimes merely 
rhetorical, and at other times, consequential. It is as absurd to argue that the state’s 
presence is felt at the dinner table as it is to assume that China's socialist state 
apparatus is disarmed and therefore unable to clamp down upon what it deems 
'harmful’ to socialist spiritual civilization. When it comes to the stipulation of a 
standard daily intake of calories (2600 g), protein (72 g), and fat (72 g) for every 
citizen, the government may indeed be powerless, and the Nutrition directive a paper 
tiger. But governmental action against the once-booming marketing industry of 
'multi-level marketing' affected the lives of tens of millions. 'Multi-level marketeers’ 
(or Mice Club members in the Chinese idiom) cut across gender, age, social groups, 
rural and urban boundaries, and established extensive and multiplying direct-selling 
networks all over China. The state's efforts to regulate this nascent industry, a 
seedbed for mountebanks and con men, dated back to 1995 with half a dozen 
half-hearted directives. When it became clear that 'the Law of Regulating Multi-Level 
Marketing' (1997) did not do much to curb the organized swindling activities of the 
bad 'multi-level marketing' elements, the State Department and the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce intervened in early 1998 to practise what a communist 
regime knows best: outlawing the industry categorically. (Renmin ribao 5 February 
1998; Li, Bida 1998). 
 
These two cases illustrate that state intervention in post-socialist China may 
amount to nothing more than a symbolic bidding, or conversely, it may bear witness 
to a potent ruling apparatus already in place. An interventionist state, in other words, 
has real claws on one hand, and sham ones on the other. This question - whether the 
Chinese state is powerful - is thus a red herring and a question whose answer can 
only be provided by multi-year empirical teamwork undertaken by social scientists 
and cultural theorists together. This is a point to which I will return when I address 
the larger question of theorizing the Chinese state in the last section. For now, the 
issue that the theorists of the post-socialist state must confront is the agenda and 
rationality (rather than the ruling capacity) of the state. Predictably, this is not a 
proposition that China analysts are eager to defend: powerful or not, the Chinese state 
is not purposeless. 
 
What then is its governing vision? There are different approaches to an analysis of 
such a vision. Political economists debated over the issue of 'state capacity'4 by 
examining Beijing's fiscal policies and the changing central-provincial fiscal relations 
in the wake of the 1994 tax-sharing reform (Li, Linda Chelan 1999). I contribute to the 
discussion of the growing or waning presence of the state by exploring the pedagog- 
ical practices of the post-socialist state that came to be inscribed in popular discourses. 
 
First of all, the ideal citizen, which the Chinese state has taken pains to enculturate 
since 1992, is no longer the class or national subject, but a civilized subject. Through 
what means does the state target its modern population for thought and conduct 
transformation? The answer to this question can hardly rest on 'policing' alone. In 
post-1992 China, social regulation took subtler pedagogical forms, but its effect is at 
once immediate and pervasive. The reinvention of a social imaginary, and with it, a 
new subject, depends heavily upon the making of a new common sense. 
 
Mass media is the most effective channel through which new social discourses 
engineered by the state can be propagated and circulated. The sheer extent of the 
discursive shift of post-1992 China is unprecedented. Gone are the decades-old 
discourses such as 'modem consciousness', 'reform and opening [to the outside 
world]’and 'culture fever’. What greets the Chinese public daily (in newspapers and 
on television) is a new inventory of officially enfranchised discourses such as 'leisure 
culture', legalizing economy', 'knowledge economy,5, 'commercial ethics', 'changing 
tracks’, 'the unemployment of state workers' and, of course, 'corporatization’. 
 
Other society slang terms (e.g. 'men with deep pockets' and 'secretary-mistresses') 
undoubtedly captured popular imagination as tenaciously as the official idiom listed 
above. There is no single discursive regime that can now claim its monopoly over an 
increasingly stratified and contradictory social reality of 1990s China. But we can 
proclaim with certainty that both pop and the official lingo tapped to the same 
rhythm of a post-enlightenment era. All those catch phrases point to the emergence 
of a new common-sense drifting toward a post-ideological perception of homo 
economicus. How to redefine the meaning of entitlement is the central issue. A double 
discursive shift has noticeably taken place since the mid-1990s: the expropriation of 
the intellectuals' discourse of enlightenment by the state's discourse of access and, 




Just how effectively could the state mobilize its re-established discursive hegemony to 
propagate a politics of access? And what does the ‘access' refer to? What is the new 
entitlement programme like? My previous work on 'leisure culture' as a popular 
discourse in metropolitan China suggests some answers to those questions (Wang 
2001). The significance of leisure culture campaigns in Beijing cannot be overstated. So 
symbolic was the capital's Double Leisure Day Campaign (1996) that leisure culture 
fevers soon blasted other townships and metropolises. 
 
In February 1996, the Propaganda Bureau of the Municipal Commission in Beijing 
published its latest version of 'A Civilizational Contract with Residents'. To im- 
plement this contract, the Bureau, together with 12 sub-committees, launched a 
nine-month long campaign of the 'Double Leisure Day Action Package’. Several major 
leisure activities were promoted: visiting museums, going to the movies and theatres, 
doing sports, sightseeing, learning English, and learning how to use computers. This 
was the first time that the municipal state appropriated the category of 'leisure 
culture' into its pedagogical agenda and, in so doing, gave a face-lift to the Party's 
age-old discourse of socialist spiritual civilization. The theme underlying this oper- 
ation was unambiguously put as 'learning how to become a modem and civilized 
Beijingese’. The resident's capacity for being a modern, cultured urban citizen is 
now being measured by his or her recognition of the changing concept of time into 
pastime. Furthermore, not only is the concept of 'time7 disciplined into that of 
'pastime but the concept of 'civil resident’ - and by extension, 'civil citizen' - itself 
incorporates the new meaning of 'civil consumer,. You may ask: what is at stake for 
the state? 
 
As an unabashed summons to the public to consume 'free time’Leisure Culture 
campaigns had several understated agendas: it officially introduces the concept of 
'pastime' as a new yardstick by which the civil qualities of Beijingese can be 
measured; it links 'leisure' with outdoor activities; and, by implication, it stimulates 
consumer demand that would soak up inventory and accelerate mass production in 
turn. In other words, by naming leisure-as-consumption, the state disciplines pro- 
duction simultaneously. Furthermore, in advocating rational recreations, all of which 
emphasize the public character of entertainment, Beijing's municipal government 
came up with its own powerful antidotes against the triple evils of capitalism: 
conspicuous consumption, a rampant privacy-driven pleasure industry that corrupts 
public morality, and, most important, the rising social discontent resulting from the 
quickly expanding hierarchies between the haves and have-nots. Ideological stakes 
aside, there was an economic raison d'etre for the policy of the double leisure day: the 
boom of the tertiary sector. Since 1995, fast growing traditional service industries (e.g. 
retailing, distribution, tourism, food, commerce, public transportation and public 
service) and the new tertiary sector (e.g. information, consulting services, science/ 
technology, finance and real estate) have created new opportunities of employment, 
absorbed surplus labour from state-owned enterprises, and fuelled up the GDP 
growth. The local economy, in particular, relies on the quick expansion of the tertiary 
sector. The state's enculturation of the consciousness of 'leisure' in the mind of urban 
citizens has thus gone a long way, both in terms of ideological and economic gains. 
 
What gets easily shuffled out of view, however, are neither the ideological stakes 
nor the economic epiphenomenon but the policy origins of leisure culture fever. 
'Double leisure day', or its alternate term 'the big weekend', is a discursive construct 
whose birthday can be dated precisely because it was a state policy decreed, 
significantly, on Labor Day. Since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, until 
1994, a Chinese working week was 48 hours. And the 'leisure' activities of urbanites, 
constricted by the deficient service of public transportation on the one hand and the 
lack of public entertainment venues on the other, were largely confined within home. 
It should now be clear that the arrival of a consumption-oriented leisure fever in 
China presupposes the institutionalization of double leisure day - a 40 hour work 
week put into effect nationwide on 1 May 1995. The mutually constitutive relationship 
between policy and culture is apparent. Before we hasten to celebrate Chinese 'leisure 
culture' fever as another example of the triumph of transnationalism, we have to 
reckon with the fact that 'weekend culture" in China is an official discourse born from 
a state policy. We should ask instead (as I did in the above, with answers provided): 
what were the ideological and economic agendas of the state in announcing the 
arrival of the 'double leisure day', and no less significantly, designating its birthday 
to Labor Day? 
 
The discourse of CULTURE AS LEISURE foregrounds the policy issue because it 
refocuses our attention on the meaning of culture as a state instrument for subject 
formation. More specifically, discourses about the 'double leisure day' reveal to us the 
changing political technologies of a modernizing state polity: it reorganizes rec- 
reational spaces, constructs the meaning of the new citizen-consumer, disciplines 
production and consumption simultaneously, and reinvents the notion of 'the public 
(sphere)’ by defining it in terms of the people’s entitlement to leisure cultural goods 
and services. The emphasis on the centrality of leisure culture as an egalitarian 
discourse is strategically vital to a regime caught in the dilemma of having to carry 
out its agenda of globalization while finding the means to mediate the contradictions 
resulting from uneven capital accumulation. The public, however, hardly recognized 
leisure discourse as governmental propaganda. On the contrary, "leisure culture' was 
seen as a social discourse smuggled into China from abroad and camouflaged as a 
cultural symptom of China coming west - a giant leap towards a faceless global 
village. 
 
All this may be true. And I have no intention of downgrading transnationalism as 
an analytical grid for studies of contemporary Chinese culture. But 'double leisure 
day' discourses are as much about control and statist logic as they are about pleasure 
and transnationalism. Those discourses unfold the happy vista of an egalitarian 
consumer public theoretically unmarred by vertical hierarchies; in short, participation 
in the democratic consumption of leisure culture. There is a certain compensatory 
logic at work here: if post-socialist China is increasingly divided by re-emerging social 
inequality, officially sponsored leisure culture and symbolic consumption are at least 
affordable, and available to all. 
 
Part II: a new common sense 
 
The call for rational recreation serves as one of the many instances that demonstrate 
the heavy investment of the Chinese state in the ongoing process of (social) knowl- 
edge production, known as common sense in lay language. Laying bare the complicit 
relationship between popular social discourses and state agenda may constitute a 
critical exercise in its own right. However, my purpose of undertaking such an 
exercise is to go beyond this familiar territory by foregrounding the significance of the 
field of culture understood as 'constitutively governmental’Bennett 1992: 32). 
 
The downgrading of the culture/government couplet in Chinese studies today can 
indeed be better understood if we remember the oversaturation of modern Chinese 
history with 'culture as propaganda’. Reinventing this problem at this moment, 
however, is urgent on many grounds. It addresses the methodological imbalance 
arisen from the dominant 'culture/market' dyad. Even more significantly, it compli- 
cates the question of historical discontinuity. I have shown how the post-socialist state 
has undergone a transformation from autocratic to regulatory polity. So is post-1992 
Chinese state qualitatively different from Mao's reign? This kind of binary thinking - 
asserting the total disjunction of one era from the other or insisting upon its continuity 
in crude terms - defeats our purpose of understanding the many faces of the 
post-socialist regime. That the state has become more entrepreneurial and image-con- 
scious now does not imply that it has given up its means and end of setting the 
agenda for popular culture. The intent to exercise control over culture, the mainstay 
of the socialist platform, persists in the post-socialist tenure. Contrary to all the hypes 
about the market determination of culture, not only is contemporary Chinese popular 
culture not cut loose from state practices, but it oftentimes maintains a parasitic 
relationship with policy proclamations and political slogans. 
 
The crux of the matter then is not the weakening of the purpose, but the 
technological refinement - or, shall we say, modernization - of the state ruling 
apparatus - a modern vision of governance materialized neither in force nor in crude 
ideological campaigns but in a newly made COMMON SENSE. So skilfully is the 
post-socialist state weaving its agenda into a new common sense that ideology is 
blurring into (commercial) culture, and the haunting presence of the state is disguised 
in the new apparel of the market. Today, on the mere surface, 'leisure culture’ 
represents market reasoning rather than a statist logic. This is, after all, what 
hegemony is all about: naturalization of ruling technologies. 
 
The discourse of 'leisure as culture' illustrates how cultural policies serve as 
powerful tools for the making of a new common sense made up of two basic 
understandings: (1) common enjoyment is a right for all; (2) the necessity of modem 
citizens to consume leisure. At least two issues were immediately shoved underneath 
the carpet: the citizen's civil and political rights; and the third issue, of citizenship and 
social rights, superseded. 
 
In the meantime, other supporting discourses for this new common sense have 
entered into quick circulation and become part of the reconstructed social knowledge. 
Among them are discourses on ‘consumption’, 'consumer', and 'legalizaing economy' 
and 'commercial ethics' (Li, Tuo 1998). Critical of both agrarian and communist values 
while affirmative about the concept of credit and contractual spirit, the discourse of 
'commercial ethics' drives home the paradox of post-socialist China: the blurring of 
state logic into market reasoning. In fact, sometimes, it is hard to tell which is being 
co-opted by the other. In a complementary movement, discourses about consumption 
and 'legalizing economy' highlight the key moment in social engineering of the 
post-socialist state: how to link common sense with a view of citizenship that is 
developed in the definition of neither civil nor political rights, but in terms of a 
vaguely conceived notion of social rights defined not as redistributive justice, but as 
a matter of consumers' entitlement to authentic brand names.6 Should it surprise any 
one that accompanying the mushrooming of legal discourses since the mid-1990s are 
editorial headlines such as 'protecting consumer rights is the self and same as 
protecting human rights?' (Yang and Pan 1998: 16). 
 
Once again, indubitably, we are witnessing a changing political rationality at 
work. This brings us back full circle to my argument about the interconnection 
between state policies, enculturation, ideal residentship/citizenry, and the construc- 
tion of common sense. My discussion of Beijing's leisure culture campaigns serves as 
one example of enculturation - the state's emphasis on a modem Chinese citizen's 
entitlement to 'leisure' and a 'cultured' way of life. 'Mass recreation' as propagated in 
those leisure campaigns forms an integral part of the arduous process of citizen 
formation. To consume leisure and to strike against fake brand names has become 
common sense for cultured, law-abiding citizens. Culture, seen in this light, can be 
best defined, quoting Tony Bennett, as a set of 'institutionally embedded relations of 
government in which forms of thought and conduct of extended populations are 
targeted for transformation, (Bennett 1992: 26). At stake is the legitimation of the state. 
At its disposal are the mass media that shape popular disposition toward a new 
economic subjectivity in the ideal citizen. There is a certain consistency of this subject 
imagined by the Chinese state: this is a subject that works harder and moonlights 
more in order to spend more for leisure, a subject that partakes in rational recreation 
to maximize his (renewed) capacity for labour, a subject committed to bailing herself 
out of the 'unemployment’ rut through the cultivation of the enterprising self, a 
subject learning to become a law abiding consumer with a burgeoning 'finance 
consciousness' and a will to save less and invest more (hopefully on real estate and 
stock), and ultimately a subject that is subjugated to market reasoning at the state's 
command. 
 
An interventionist state highly conscious of what its own regulatory logic has 
achieved cannot be dismissed as an ensemble of contingent managerial mechanisms 
reacting to crises. Common sense as a new means of enculturation - and the key to 
hegemony - has proven that state policies can claim the status of, and blur into, 
normalizing discourses. The presence of the state, if felt at all, is accepted as a 
benevolent one that serves the best interest of a Chinese public who now take the 
post-ideological form of rule for granted. The story of hegemony as the process of 
naturalization of power is now complete. 
 
 
Part III: the state question and policy studies 
 
The previous section demonstrates the complexity of the problematic of state versus 
market provision. Capital and the state are not external to each other. The legitimation 
of the post-socialist regime depends upon how well the ruling elite navigates between 
laissez-faire capitalism and state socialism. 'Leisure culture' provides one of the many 
examples where marketization is seen not as incompatible with the Party State's 
propaganda objectives and ideological control. 
 
Nor should national provisions and state policies be seen as questions relevant 
only to Chinese studies. Revamping the state problem carries methodological 
ramifications for a jaded US cultural studies establishment that remains disconnected 
to the public to whom a rhetorical oppositionalism matters little. How do we reorient 
a meta-critical cultural studies that often theorizes from the vacuum toward grounded 
critical cultural policy studies? This entails a shift of critical agenda from the studies 
of the politics of representation to a critical engagement with policy. First, however, 
any responsible critic suspicious of foundational thinking should acknowledge the 
convoluted route between policy and politics so as not to mistake modern-day policy 
makers as a homogenous body serving a singular agenda only. In the case of China, 
the identification between policy and a single source of power (emanating from the 
centre) is even less sustainable because the political field of post-socialist China is 
traversed by multiple players (at the central, provincial, and other subgoverning 
levels) with competing, conflicting interests. 
 
This said, let me turn to the question of theorizing the post-socialist Chinese state. 
First of all, my exercise so far attempts to locate an interface between those political 
theorists whose interest is placed on state institutions and cultural theorists, such as 
Gramsci and Althusser, who focus on the ideological practices and discourses of the 
state. The 'state' understood in the latter sense has no demarcated peripheries, a 
conceptual ambivalence characteristic of all cultural theorists' approach to the state 
question. Such an absence of conceptual clarity can be remedied if we reinsert our 
examination of state discourses into an institutional frame of analysis. State ideolo- 
gies, no matter how amorphous they may appear, can only be articulated (in the form 
of a continually reinvented 'common sense') and reproduced through specific projects 
that are orchestrated by state organs. Thus, the study of the ideological practices of 
the state presupposes the investigation of the institutional means of intervention 
 
available at the state's disposal. My discussion of 'leisure culture’, for instance, 
demonstrates how the ideology of consuming leisure was dependent upon the 
institutionalization of the 8 hour/5 day working week in 1995. Yet supplementing the 
ideological study of the state's intent by foregrounding the institutional analysis of its 
practices has its own pitfalls. 
 
The Foucauldian notion that the state has no essence but an ensemble of changing 
institutional practices risks overstating the case of the primacy of practices over intent 
(Foucault 1991; Gordon 1991: 4). As contemporary supplements to Foucault's empha- 
sis on micro-powers, theories about the fluidity of the state, or a withering state - cast 
after Adam Smith's thesis on the invisible hand - may carry a certain truth in 
characterizing the modern liberal state and neo-liberal state in Europe and America. 
The Chinese state, however, with its 50 year old tradition of state monopoly socialism 
on one hand and its deeply ingrained Confucian prototype of ‘state-family, (what the 
Chinese term 'state' literally means) on the other, unfolds a picture of political 
reasoning that is not only not invisible but which certainly cannot be derived from a 
Western paradigm that emphasizes the 'elimination of the family as a model’ for the 
development of the art of government from the eighteenth century onward (Foucault 
1991: 98). In the general scheme of things, the Chinese (central and local) state 
apparatus remains the primary vector of power, and its rationality, intrinsic to the art 
of government. 
 
Programming the theoretical project 
 
What resources are available for theorizing the Chinese post-socialist state, if we 
cannot borrow Western paradigms verbatim? Or, rather, what conceptual steps need 
to be taken to circumvent China cultural theorists' default practice of subjecting 
Chinese data to Western theoretical metanarratives? To turn this analytical habit on 
its head, we need to study the Chinese political theories of governance as practised 
by both the imperial state and the modern nation-state founded after 1911. Next, the 
plurality of Chinese locales has to be brought into the theoretical discourse to 
complicate the notion of 'governing' and the 'governed’. Macro-geographically, 
China's vast inland makes 'multiple localities' a far more daunting question for state 
theorists who study China than for those who study North America or southern 
Europe. The Guangdong model, for instance, is as markedly different from the 
Xinjiang or Tibet model, as it is from the Shanxi or Yunnan models. To complicate the 
picture further, even within a single province, the multi-layered sub-governing 
structure (e.g. metropolis, county, township) makes generalizations about adminis- 
trative infrastructure difficult to draw. 
 
Those conceptual parameters aside, methodologically, a theoretical project about 
the Chinese state has to begin with the study of state policies. To wit, a grounded, 
judicious mapping and critique of the 'overarching7 system of state power (whether 
we are speaking of institutions or ideologies) are predicated on the examination of the 
concrete instrument of statist domination and control, i.e. public policy, seen in its 
pluralistic manifestations as it traffics through various local states, their agencies, and 
various other embodiments. This methodological point of entry, inasmuch as the 
concept of ‘policy’ provides the meeting ground between the study of state discourses 
and that of state institutions, has the advantage of drawing together the analytical 
resources of both cultural studies and institutional studies. Just to name a few policy 
areas that may help us draw a composite profile of the Chinese state in action: 
poverty-alleviation programmes, social welfare, housing reform, migrant labour, 
environmental protection, marriage law, advertising, fiscal policies, national minori- 
ties policies, electronic communication and intellectual property laws and higher 
education. The abstract theoretical question of state discourses, state capacities, and 
state institutions can only be addressed from critical perspectives developed from 
collaborative researches on the material processes of the making and implementation 
of specific social, economic, and cultural policies, processes that unfolded at provin- 
cial and subprovincial governing sites as well as in Beijing. 
 
Such a study, exhaustive as it may sound, does not risk self-fragmentation because 
it evolves from a central theoretical question that coheres diverse examinations of 
different policy initiatives and policy environments. Namely, how does the Chinese 
theoretical framework 'there are policies above, but counter-measures from below' 
complicate the question of structure versus agency? This framework stresses the 
plurality of government-based policy locations by assigning cardinal value to the 
issue of policy implementation taking place at subgoverning sites below (rather than 
focusing on policy making at the centre, from above). It is when a given policy is 
passed down to the next level of government for implementation that local stakes 
emerge to give life to the concept of agency. The agency question thus foregrounded 
is especially intriguing in the Chinese context because the symbolic locale of the 
'above' and the 'below' shifts simultaneously within each of the five levels of the 
hierarchical structure of governance. Province, metropolis, county township, and 
village - each is positioned above and below the other at the same time. With the 
exception of village, the smallest unit, which is more or less self-governed, each level 
of government serves as a double-player - handing down policies to the next lower 
level while inventing counter-measures to deal with the government at one level 
above so that local interests can be fully articulated and safeguarded. 
 
The increasingly important problem of local interests and local states has indeed 
demonstrated the larger trend of the political rationality of the post-socialist state. 
While the state remains efficacious, its power is purposefully diffused to different 
segments of the social body as part of the larger programme of the modernization of 
its ruling apparatus. This implies that the dissemination of power is a state policy. For 
the first time in Chinese history, we can speak of a growing nexus of power relations 
that is not exactly vertical - social control from above - but horizontal and increas- 
ingly multilateral. The reconfiguration of the centre vis-a-vis the local - both now 
unstable entities that exist in and through relation to each other - can only be brought 
into relief if we follow an empirically based, theoretically motivated programme as I 
laid out above. It is only through our reckoning with the multiple localities of China 
that the concealed question of agency in post-socialist polity can reveal itself in its full 
complexity. That is, a critical policy study of China anchors the project of theorizing 
the state in a double analytical frame of control and agency. How to discuss the 
'agency' question from within, not outside, the dominant narrative of the state, is a 
theoretical lesson that the specific locale of post-socialist China provides for critics 
who, by too readily conflating 'agency' with the Western notion of (political) resist- 
ance and alternatives, pared it down to a term of simple ‘oppositionalism’. 
 
Such a grand scheme, of course, demands carefully planned teamwork, which 
remains a vision at this stage.7As a modest and preliminary attempt at anticipating 
how the question of agency may play itself out in the process of the increasingly 
centrifugal flow of the social-local, I turn to the tiniest and the lowest governmental 




The street as an organizational unit - a legacy of Maoism- is not only unlikely to 
vanish in corporatizing China, but in many instances, it has succeeded in capitalizing 
on the privatization initiative and resuscitating its administrative capacity. Given the 
unevenness of development and hence the impossibility of generalizing about 'China' 
from a single given locale, I shall avoid collapsing my examination of the street 
administration at particular districts in two metropoles into a grand theorization 
about the street organizational reform of /China,. Theorizing the local' is an oxy- 
moron that I view with increasing suspicion. My immediate purpose is to challenge 
the conventional thinking about the categorical demise of street committees as 
an administrative unit in post-1992 China. This is not to suggest that the street 
committees' infamous power of prying into the neighbours' affairs remained intact, 
given the increasingly fragmentary structure of the urban landscape that would 
undergo even faster decentralization as the housing reform is in full swing. There are 
simply more profitable ends for the street committees to pursue. What caught my 
attention is the rehabilitation of the image of street committees in some metropolitan 
quarters in recent years, as it evolved from a moribund unit focused on the odds- 
and-ends of domesticity, to an enterprising module cohering the economic and 
social functions of the neighbourhood. I will summarize an important study written 
by a scholar at Fudan University on the structural reform of street committees in 
contemporary Shanghai and supplement those arguments with my own observations 
about the changing function of the street as a vibrant economico-administrative 
unit in Beijing. Both instances rewrite the binary grammar of control versus 
autonomy. 
 
The subtitle of Zhu Jian'gang's essay – ‘A Model of Strong State and Strong 
Society' - summarizes neatly his challenge to the binarism in which 'strong society’ 
and 'strong state' preclude each other. He argues, instead, that within the dominion 
of the street, the Party state and the autonomous space of the social do not 
discriminate against each other. On the contrary, they are mutually constitutive. Thus, 
the growth of local autonomy does not presuppose and dictate the mitigation of state 
power. The coexistence of the powerful centre and a strong locale is not only not a 
theoretical contradiction but a reality attested by case studies. 
 
Studying the change of administrative structure of a Shanghai street district, Five 
Miles Bridge, from 1949-1997, Zhu Jian'gang shows us how the power structure of 
this particular district evolved from a simple mechanism of Party monopolism to 
today's three-tier coordinating apparatus. The new system of street management is 
made up not only of pre-existing official establishments such as the Street Office and 
Residents' Committee, but also of half a dozen newly formed 'intermediary’or some 
may say, semi-autonomous, organizations. Between those official and semi-official 
organizations, the state-appointed Street Committee of Party Work Force wove its 
way in and out via a delicate bureaucratic latticework of supervision. One may indeed 
argue that the authority of the state is strengthened in the wake of this organizational 
realignment. However, the relationship between the centre and local is never again 
the same as before. Decision making about street affairs is now mediated by a 
criss-crossing network of management, which acknowledges and invites the partici- 
pation of unofficial channels. This is a small revolution that goes a long way. The local 
resources and power of the Wuliqiao Street District are now to be shared rather than 
dominated by the Party. The street-based administrative ensemble, a medley of 
central and local elements in the name of the 'Urban District Management Com- 
mittee,’ is dubbed as a Politburo in miniature (Zhu Jian'gang 1997). This signifies a 
systemic change, a track-shifting (zhuangui) from the top-down to a bottom-up order 
of governance. 
 
All signs lead us to anticipate, as Zhu Jian'gang predicts, an intriguing metropoli- 
tan streetscape - a continual redistribution of the administrative power of street 
districts and an increasing vocalization of residents for participatory politics. Paradox- 
ically, the deeper the penetration of the state into foundational social units, the faster 
it stimulates the growth of the self-governing capacity of the semi-autonomous space 
emerging from within. Political power has begun the long-awaited process of dif- 
fusion and decentralization in post-socialist China - a cliche delivered to us from 
analysts on macro-fiscal planning down to this specific case study of the management 
of the street as a microscopic social unit. The Foucauldian call for 'cutting off the 
King’s head in analyses of power and sovereignty' (Jarvis and Paolini 1995: 9) is a far 
cry for post-1992 China. The blurred boundaries between state and society in 
post-1992 China took the edge off, instead of answering, the Foucauldian bidding. The 
centre is not a straw man, although it agrees to an arrangement that society's parasitic 
existence with the state is beneficial rather than inimical to itself - a clear landmark 
of Chinese post-socialism. 
 
The street will no doubt continue to play an important role in this shifting 
landscape of governance, especially if we recognize its double function both as a 
management unit and as an economic module, cashing in on the privatization 
incentive. I may even suggest that the street cannot sustain its governing efficacy if it 
exists merely as an administrative superstructure without a material base. This is 
especially true when, in recent years, street councils were obliged to participate in 
more and more budget-taxing programmes such as cooperating with district police 
departments to fight against drug traffickers, keeping prostitution in check, and 
holding other bad elements in surveillance. Beijing's 'Hard Strike' Campaign (1996- 
1997) against street gangs and criminals would be inconceivable without its tapping 
into the street's policing resources. And in the wake of the state-sector reform, it 
became obvious that the street is also called upon to bear the burden of containing the 
socially displaced - those who no longer work for state-owned industries. As more 
and more social responsibilities were transferred from dissolving work units to street 
committees in urban China, the latter have replaced the former as the pivot of social 
organization and an occupational centre for surplus labour. It should not be surpris- 
ing, then, that street based communal services are now considered as a vital gateway 
-next to the private sector - to opportunities of reemployment, especially for those 
labourers whose occupational skills are limited.8 
 
This affirms that we cannot assign a mere symbolic value to the status inflation of 
the street in urban China. The street is an economic as well as a political unit. Take 
Beijing for example, a post-socialist 'street economy' conceptualized in the model of 
modern commercial streets constitutes the backbone of the capital city's bid for urban 
regeneration. When the five-year long reconstruction of Dongan Market was finally 
completed in January 1998, all the neighbouring retailers and department stores on 
Wangfujing Street anticipated a comeback that demanded a strategically formed 
united front rather than old-time cut-throat competition (Zhu Ying 1997: 1; Li, Fei 
1998: 7). This entails that commercial contests are seen to take place increasingly 
between streets/districts rather than between individual stores that may or may not 
carry a vintage name as weighty as 'Dongan'. 
 
Joining Wangfujing in similar face-lifting moves toward developing a street-based 
thicket of commercial best sellers are the Big Palisade (Da Zhalan) near the Forbidden 
City and Zhongguancun in the vicinity of Beida. As Old Peking's first and most active 
commercial street, Big Palisade is banking on the critical mass of age-old trademarks 
(lao zeihao) to lure back consumers who have been drawn to modern-day department 
stores. All publicity campaigns about Dazhalan zeroed in on its provision of a vibrant 
street culture that is at once culturally authentic and cost effective. This forms such a 
contrast to Zhongguancun in the Haidian District, best known for it appeal to 
customers who linger on its fabled streets of electronic goods with deeper pockets 
looking toward the postmodern West. 
 
What fascinates me about the quick development of street economy in China's 
metropolitan centres is not merely some district head's fantasy about building 
ten contiguous commercial streets - each featuring its own staple - as a blueprint 
to measure up with Ginza in Tokyo (Pan Jie 1997: 1). All the strategic planning 
in various degrees stress the 'social efficacy' of street economy, reminding me that 
China is, after all, a regime recalcitrant about keeping its socialist legacies as best as 
it can. 
 
In this light, the street as a throwback to revolutionary China beckons us to take 
note of its rich communist traditions. Street economy, in fact, is nothing less than a 
remnant of the Great Leap Forward, reminiscent of an economic collectivism. Perhaps 
it is those mnemonic associations with the socialist past that prompt me to look 
beyond the postmodern streetscape-to-be for a China to which the following ques- 
tions are of critical importance: What are the fiscal implications of a booming street 
economy in metropolitan centres? What is the income tax policy for street retailers, 
department stores, and licensed street peddlers? How much of it flows into the 
budget of street committees that take charge of non-profit communal organizations? 
And in what way is the street-based taxation institutionalized? In other words, did the 
street as a political and social unit feed on the street as an economic unit? 
 
Those are questions I am not prepared to answer, not only because they fall out 
of my area of speciality, but perhaps even more significantly, because of my lack of 
a working relationship that indigenous researchers of my intellectual profile may have 
forged, formally or informally, with politicians and policy makers who wrestle with 
questions of whither China goes. I raise those questions not in a problem-solving 
spirit, but for the purpose of recapitulating my observation about the symbiosis 
between research and policy, and to bring home a point that cultural studies scholars 
would gladly ignore: that is, researchers generate knowledge that may be useful to the 
public and to the powerful agencies they vow to critique but only pay a lip service 
to change. I am not naive about the power relations between researchers and policy 
makers under a regime known for its disciplinary rigor. But I want to emphasize: new 
conceptualizations of a social issue emerging from research 'does trickle and percolate 
through to both policy makers and the general public' (Bartley 1994: 205), registering 
concern in time, if not revising socio-economic agendas immediately. 
 
We have now come full circle in my argument - the central place of state and 
policy in cultural studies. A few final words need to be said about the vulnerable 
spots of policy-oriented cultural studies to complete the picture. Given how much 
influence the state and global market exerted in tandem on Chinese consumer and 
popular culture, too often we dwell on the issue of power, drawing a premature 
equation between the 'people' - who are agents with multiple and conflicting subject 
positions - and the faceless 'masses' who are said to be doomed to subjugate to 
ideological domination of national and/or international power blocs. But whether we 
define the 'people' as agents or dupes, we have to address the complex nature of the 
'people’s' (and our own) complicity with popular cultural forms. Thus, within the 
theoretical framework of the popular and its relationship to ideology, the question of 
PLEASURE is critical. This is a problem unfortunately given little room in policy 
studies that emphasize the omnipresence and power of the state over the individual 
agent of desire. 
 
Luckily, the body fulfils more functions than the Body Politic. There are numerous 
sites and spaces, for instance, where the sexualization of the social takes place beyond 
the reach of the state. Dai Jinhua, Judy Farquhar and Tani Barlow's work illustrate 
examples that may fill in the programmatic gap of policy studies (Dai 2001; Barlow 
2001; Farquhar 2001). At issue is the privatization of pleasure as a post-revolutionary 
phenomenon. More work in this line is called for if we are to complicate the issue of 
desire, consumption, and new social agents, and render a credible picture of the wide 
social spectrum on which the post-socialist country moves back and forth, with 
eruptive energies, between an articulate statist vision and the amorphous chimeras of 
the 'people's'. 
 
Asking how we can develop a methodology and a critical vocabulary capturing 
the latter - the intangible private pleasures of improvisation - is to remind ourselves 
of what traditional policy studies cannot achieve. Only by combining the resources of 
cultural studies and policy studies can we develop a critical agenda that examines the 
issue of structure/programming side by side with that of agency/improvisation. The 
complex social practices of post-socialist agents (these include individual agents as 
well as institutional agencies) can only be unravelled through the collaborative 
programme of 'critical policy studies'. Ultimately, the challenge for Chinese policy 
makers is to navigate carefully between the utopian and authoritarian drives of state 
socialism; and our mission as advocates of critical policy/culture studies is to 
anticipate an alternative model emerging out of socialism's utopian character while 





David S. G. Goodman, Tani Barlow, Kuan-hsing Chen and Prasenjit Duara gave me 
invaluable suggestions to revise this paper. I also benefited a great deal from the 




1. Their preoccupation with this myth may demonstrate, in some instances, a habitual 
embrace 
of dominant first-world theoretical discourses and, in other instances, a critical spirit against 
the totalitarian state at home and hence a conscious ideological commitment to Western 
liberalism, which takes as its mission the eradication of 'Oriental despotism/ 
 
2. I am referring to the Malaysian government's attempt of luring foreign investment back 
into 
the country after the drastic measures it took to control the flows or flight of transnational 
capital in and out of the country. According to this new policy, investors will be able to 
withdraw their money from Malaysia immediately. But they will be subject to exit taxes. 
Percentages will be calibrated according to the duration that their money stays in the 
country. See New York Times (1999). 
 
3. Among the few China scholars who challenged this logic is Australian scholar David S. 
G. 
Goodman. For an example, see Goodman (1994). 
 
4. The debate over 'state capacities7 of the 1990s China was triggered by a 1993 report 
written by Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang 'Jiaqiang zhongx/ang zhengfu zai shichang jingji 
zhuanxing zhong de zhudao zuoyong, (Strengthening the Leadership Role of Central State in the 
Transition of Market Economy). Wang and Hu sound alarms about the weakening of the central 
state's fiscal capacity, which they argue, results in a series of chain reactions that diminishes 
the 'steering capacity’'legitimacy capacity’ and ’coercive capacity’ of the government. Since 
its publication in 1993, this essay paved the way for the 1994 fiscal reform and provoked 
many debates in academic circles both in China and abroad. One high-profiled forum of 
debates can be found in Ershiyi shiji: A Bi-monthly (The Twenty-First Century), No. 2 (1994): 
4-23. 
 
5. 'Knowledge economy' is a term that has gained increasing popularity in 1998. It first 
surfaced when the 'information age’ is said to have landed in metropolitan China. With the 
rise of purchasing power of Chinese urban consumers, the electronics industry flourished. 
Concepts associated with information-technological knowledge entered social discourses. 
Gates' 1996 visit to Shanghai further intensified the fever over 'knowledge as capital'. 
'Capital' here is understood not as a symbolic token, but real cash. In 1998, when national 
universities such as Fudan University and Jiaotong University in Shanghai became stock- 
holders of giant corporations and pumped their stock value dramatically, the 'knowledge 
economy' acquired a different valence and resurfaced as a powerful social discourse. 
 
6. I am referring to the practices of daring consumers, such as Wang Hai in Beijing. Wang 
made the headlines of national news when he went store by store in 1996 to hunt for goods 
of fake brand names. He bought them all and then went back to the stores for recompense 
as the Law of Consumer Rights Protection stipulates. Debates over whether he is a hero or 
a rogue lasted for years. In the wake of the Wang Hai phenomenon, an avalanche of lawsuits 
was filed by consumers against corporations, companies, and retailers that manufacture and 
sell fake brand names and goods across the country. A nationwide campaign of consumer 
consciousness raising caught on. 
 
7. This project of critical policy studies was envisioned by David S. G. Goodman (University 
of Technology in Sydney) and myself in 1999. Concrete plans about how to implement this 
vision are being discussed. It will start as a multi-year project, built around an annual 
workshop, evolving around an international and interdisciplinary team of scholars (based in 
different geographical locales) in sociology, political economy, cultural studies, cultural 
anthropology, women's studies, environmental studies, and history. Policies of interest 
include cultural, educational, social and economic policies. 
 
8. Those communal services include appliance repairs, elder care and childcare, delivery, 
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Appendix. Special terms 
 
the big weekend +rC 
changing tracks  
civilized subject GJ 




culture fever G e 
double leisure day I 
economic subjectivity wc¥ 
fake brand names A 
finance consciousness p 
Five Miles Bridge X 
Hard Strike &A 
intermediary 
 
knowledge economy pwc 
legalizing economy ^wc 
leisure culture G  
men with deep pockets +Z 
modern consciousness h> 
multi-level marketing  
province ocounty xtownship and village P 
reform and opening [to the outside world]D¡E 
secretary-mistresses 2 
social efficacy qLFn 
socially displaced 	4z5 
state (0 
state capacity (0| 
the street  
street economy wc 
streets of electronic goods -T 
system ¥ 
tertiary sector sjV 
'there are policies above, but counter-measures from below' sjV	M1u 
the unemployment of state workers 	4 
urban citizenship 6[ 
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